1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP A Limited Liability Partnership Including Professional Corporations NEIL A.F. POPOVIĆ, Cal. Bar No. 132403 ANNA S. McLEAN, Cal. Bar No. 142233 TENAYA RODEWALD, Cal. Bar No. 248563 LIÊN H. PAYNE, Cal. Bar No. 291569 JOY O. SIU, Cal. Bar No. 307610 DANIEL R. FONG, Cal. Bar No. 311985 Four Embarcadero Center, 17 th Floor San Francisco, California 94111-4109 Telephone: 415.434.9100 Facsimile: 415.434.3947 Email: npopovic@sheppardmullin.com amclean@sheppardmullin.com jsiu@sheppardmullin.com jsiu@sheppardmullin.com dfong@sheppardmullin.com Attorneys for Defendant, SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY LLC					
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4	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT					
5	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION					
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17	IN RE SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY LLC LITIGATION	Case No. 3:16-cv-00523-JCS				
8	CONSOLIDATED ACTION	SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY LLC'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'				
9	CONSOLIDITIED HOTTON	ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL				
20		BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CLASS CERTIFICATION				
21		Date: May 11, 2018 Time: 2:00 p.m.				
22		Place: Courtroom G				
23		Judge: Hon. Joseph C. Spero				
24		Second Consolidated Amended Complaint				
25		filed: July 11, 2016				
26						
27	REDACTED VERSION OF DOC	UMENT SOUGHT TO BE SEALED				
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I. INTRODUCTION

Seagate showed in its Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification filed March 30, 2018 ("Opposition") that Plaintiffs' motion should be denied because, *inter alia*, (1) Plaintiffs failed to identify any common misrepresentations made by Seagate to the putative class so as to trigger a duty to disclose under *Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co.*, 668 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) and *Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co.*, 144 Cal. App. 4th (2006), and (2) Plaintiffs failed to establish a common defect or even a common failure rate that was either materially or consistently higher than Seagate's published AFR during the class period such that, even assuming the existence of a duty, there would have been anything to "disclose." ECF No. 156 at 7:4-8:11, 11:15-26; *Berryman v. Merit Property Mgmt., Inc.*, 152 Cal. App. 4th 1544, 1556-57 (2007) ("[F]ailure to disclose a fact one has no affirmative duty to disclose is [not] 'likely to deceive' anyone').

After the close of briefing, Plaintiffs now submit documents produced in the ordinary course of discovery claiming they justify a supplemental filing. They do not. The documents relate solely to *commercial users*, *not putative class members* and thus do not fix the deficiencies identified above. Nor is this new information. Plaintiffs have long known of issues that arose when commercial entities tried to save money by misusing these consumer-grade drives in environments for which they were neither specified nor designed. Even Plaintiffs' own expert agrees the experience of commercial users does not support conclusions about the failure rate of drives under consumer use. ECF No. 158-7 ("Hospodor Rebuttal Declaration") ¶ 53. The "new" documents still do not show Seagate made common, affirmative misrepresentations that gave rise to a common disclosure obligation or any presumption of class-wide reliance or materiality. Plaintiffs' Administrative Motion should be denied.


II. ARGUMENT

A. The "New" Documents Are Irrelevant, Cumulative, and Do Not Support Certification

Plaintiffs assert the newly proffered exhibits provide "direct evidence of Seagate misleading its customers[,]" "emphasize the materiality of Seagate's omissions[,]" and "form conclusions regarding the drive defects." ECF No. 167 at 3:21-27. These issues go to the merits of this case;

they do nothing to establish the requirements for class certification. Plaintiffs' request that the Court 1 2 consider these supplemental documents is therefore premature and should be denied.¹ The "New" Documents Establish Neither a Defect Nor a "High Failure Rate" 3 1. **Relevant to Consumers** 4 5 First, Plaintiffs proclaim "[t]he new documents prove that the drives were defective." ECF 6 No. 167-3 at 2:4. Then what is the defect? Plaintiffs do not seek to revive their implied warranty 7 claim with this supposed newfound evidence of a defect. In fact, they nowhere point to any 8 document that identifies a defect. Plaintiffs' claim is baseless and should be disregarded. 9 As to a "high failure rate," the same is true as to any rate that could be relevant to this case. With the exception of Exhibit 64, *none* of the "new" documents relate to drive failures in *consumer* 10 use.² 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 ¹ The discovery issues are discussed in the parties' Further Joint Case Management Statement, ECF No. 166, and will be further addressed in an upcoming discovery motion Plaintiffs 20 have stated they intend to file. As such, Seagate does not address the inflammatory (and factually unsupported) discovery accusations in Plaintiffs' submission here. 21 ² Exhibit 64 is the only "new" document that appears to relate to consumers. However, Plaintiffs fail to tell the Court that it concerns many drives not at issue. 22 23 24 The document is irrelevant. All references to "Ex." refer to this docket entry. 25 26 27 28 See ECF No. 167-3 (Proposed Supp. Brief) at 4.

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3	2. The Documents Do Not Support Plaintiffs' Claim of "Active Concealment"
4	Nor do the documents support Plaintiffs' accusation that "Seagate actively concealed
5	information about the drive's true failure rate." ECF No. 167-3 at 5.
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22	B. The Supplemental Brief and Exhibits Still Do Not Establish a Common Disclosure
23	Obligation, or Permit a Presumption of Classwide Reliance and Materiality
24	More fundamentally, the documents are irrelevant to the legal issues before the Court on
25	class certification under the correct legal standard. A majority of courts, including this one, have
26	held that "absent affirmative representations, an obligation to disclose under California law extends
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28	⁹ Nor do Plaintiffs identify any other "true" failure rate they claim Seagate should have disclosed.

	only to matters of product safety." See, e.g., McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954, 965
	(N.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Wilson, 668 F.3d at 1136-1141 (9th Cir. 2012) (Wilson)) (UCL, CLRA, and
	FAL claims dismissed because plaintiffs did not allege safety defect or affirmative representation
	giving rise to duty to disclose); Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652, 663 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
	(same); Hodson v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1024-26 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (same, collecting
	cases); Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (same); Marcus v.
	Apple, Inc., No. C 14-03824 WHA, 2015 WL 151489, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2015) (Marcus);
	Gray v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 554 Fed. App'x. 608, 609 (9th Cir. 2014) (no claim under
	UCL or CLRA absent safety issue or affirmative representation); see also ECF Nos. 156 (Class
	Cert. Opp.) at 1:12-21, 5:3-7:3, 9:18-11:14, 20:15-22:2; 158-1 (Seagate's Sur-Reply). 10
l	Applying this standard. Plaintiffs still cannot establish that putative class members were

exposed to, and relied on, any affirmative representations by Seagate that gave rise to a common duty to disclose. This is because Plaintiffs have only argued that Seagate communicated its affirmative misrepresentations through an "advertising campaign" limited to its website, which provided links to various PDFs that had representations related to RAID and AFR for a fraction of the products at issue in this case. *See* ECF No. 156 at 1:12-21, 5:3-7:3, 9:18-11:14, 20:15-22:2. None of the supplemental evidence changes these fundamental flaws in Plaintiffs' Motion. As such, the materials Plaintiffs propose to submit add nothing to their position on class certification, and the Court should deny their request to file a supplemental brief.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court should deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief and their Motion for Class Certification.

¹⁰ Indeed, Judge Alsup, who decided *Falk v. General Motors Corp.*, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1094-95 (N.D. Cal. 2007), reversed course in *Marcus*, relying on *Wilson* to hold that an omission claim based on the defendant's alleged active concealment of a defect was non-actionable. *Marcus*, 2015 WL 151489, at *5-6. This is significant because the Court of Appeal in *Collins v. eMachines*, *Inc.*, 202 Cal. App. 4th 249, 255-56 (2011) relied on *Falk* as the basis for applying the *LiMandri v. Judkins*, 52 Cal. App. 4th 326, 336 (1997) test to consumer protection claims. Of course, this Court also held that a "pure omissions" claim was not actionable under the UCL and/or CLRA in *Dana*, applying *Wilson*. The law has not changed since *Dana* so as to alter the Court's conclusion here.

	Case 3:16-cv-00523-JCS	Document 170-3	Filed 04/24/18	Page 7 of 7	
1	Dated: April 24, 2018				
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3		ANNA S. McLEAN			
4			SEAGATE TEC	For Defendant, CHNOLOGY LLC	
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF